Articles 25–28

These four articles together constitute India's model of religious freedom, which is neither pure separation (like the American wall between church and State) nor state-sponsored religion, but a distinctively Indian model sometimes called "principled distance" — the State can intervene in religious affairs for reform, regulation, and to secure other constitutional values, but broadly stays neutral among religions.

Article 25 — Individual freedom of religion. Guarantees to all persons (not just citizens) equal freedom of conscience, and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, health, and the other Fundamental Rights. Two explanations attached to Article 25 matter for exams: it permits the State to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice (economic, financial, political) and to legislate for social welfare and reform (e.g. opening Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus, addressing untouchability within temples); and it clarifies that "Hindus" in this article includes Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists for the purpose of this right, while Sikhs retain a specific right to carry the kirpan.

Article 26 — Denominational (group) rights. This is the crucial companion to Article 25, and the two are frequently tested against each other: while Article 25 protects the individual's freedom of religion, Article 26 protects the rights of a religious denomination as a collective — every such denomination (subject again to public order, morality and health) has the right to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion, (c) own and acquire movable and immovable property, and (d) administer such property in accordance with law. Note carefully: clauses (c) and (d) — property matters — can be regulated by ordinary law, but clause (b) — "matters of religion" — is a core protection the State cannot freely override, which is precisely why courts have had to develop a test for what counts as an "essential religious practice" versus a merely secular/administrative accretion.

That test traces back to the seminal Shirur Mutt case — formally The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954). The Supreme Court there held that what constitutes an "essential" religious practice must be determined with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself, not by external or governmental judgment of what is essential — but also that purely secular activities (property management, financial administration) tied to religious institutions remain subject to State regulation even though a religious body carries them out. This "essential religious practices" doctrine has since been the Court's primary tool for deciding where Article 25/26 protection ends and permissible State regulation begins, and it recurs across decades of litigation on issues from temple management to religious dress to entry restrictions.

The doctrine's most publicly debated modern application is the Sabarimala case — Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018). The Sabarimala Ayyappa temple in Kerala traditionally excluded women in the 10–50 age bracket (broadly, menstruating age) on the ground that the deity is in the form of a "Naishtik Brahmachari" (eternal celibate), and the practice was protected by a specific State rule framed under the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act. A five-judge bench, by 4:1 majority, held the exclusion unconstitutional — finding it not an "essential" practice of the faith, and holding that Article 25's promise of freedom of conscience extends equally to women, so an exclusion rooted in notions of impurity linked to menstruation could not survive constitutional scrutiny. The dissent (Justice Indu Malhotra) argued that courts should be reluctant to adjudicate what is essential to a faith practised by millions, and that constitutional morality couldn't be used to override a bona fide religious practice absent a wider societal consensus. The judgment triggered a review petition, and the Court subsequently referred larger questions about the scope of judicial review over essential religious practices (across faiths, not just this temple) to a larger bench — making Sabarimala as much a story about the limits of the essential-practices doctrine as about temple entry itself.

Article 27 — Freedom from religious taxation. No person can be compelled to pay any tax whose proceeds are specifically appropriated for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. This doesn't bar a general fee for services (e.g., a fee for managing a religious fair), only a tax earmarked to benefit one religion.

Article 28 — Freedom from religious instruction in certain educational institutions. No religious instruction can be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds (28(1)). Institutions merely recognised by the State, or receiving State aid, may provide religious instruction, but attendance cannot be compulsory without the consent of the student (or their guardian if a minor) — 28(3). Institutions administered by the State but established under an endowment/trust requiring religious instruction are exempted from the 28(1) bar (28(2)).