Judicial Standards and Accountability
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In-House Mechanisms, the Judges (Inquiry) Act, and Judicial Ethics
The Removal Process Recap and Expansion (Cross-Reference to Chapter 7)
As covered in Chapter 7, Supreme Court and High Court judges can be removed only via a Presidential order following a special-majority resolution of both Houses of Parliament, on grounds of "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" — this is often loosely called "impeachment" (though the Constitution reserves that specific term for the President under Article 61).
The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
Provides the procedural mechanism for investigating misbehaviour/incapacity allegations before a removal motion can proceed to a parliamentary vote:
- A removal motion, signed by the requisite number of MPs (100 Lok Sabha members or 50 Rajya Sabha members), is admitted by the Speaker/Chairman.
- A three-member committee (comprising a Supreme Court judge, a Chief Justice of a High Court, and a "distinguished jurist") is constituted to investigate the allegations.
- If the committee finds the judge guilty of misbehaviour/incapacity, the motion, along with the committee's report, is taken up for consideration and voting in Parliament, following the Article 124(4)/218 special-majority requirement.
Historical Note
No Supreme Court or High Court judge has ever been actually removed through this process to date, despite several attempts:
- Justice V. Ramaswami (1993): The first such case — the Inquiry Committee found him guilty on 11 of 14 charges, but the removal motion failed in the Lok Sabha when the ruling party's MPs largely abstained from voting, denying the required special majority.
- Justice Soumitra Sen (2011): The removal motion passed the Rajya Sabha with overwhelming support, but he resigned before the Lok Sabha could vote — the furthest any removal process has progressed.
- Justice P.D. Dinakaran (2011): Proceedings reached the Inquiry Committee stage before he resigned, halting the process. These cases illustrate that resignation before a final vote has, in practice, been the most common way removal proceedings have concluded — meaning India's higher judiciary has, to date, never seen an actual completed removal by parliamentary vote.
In-House Procedure (Judicial Self-Regulation, Short of Formal Removal)
Beyond the formal constitutional removal process, the judiciary has developed an "in-house procedure" — an informal mechanism (not based on any specific statute, but evolved through judicial practice/resolutions since the 1990s) by which the CJI (for Supreme Court judges) or a Chief Justice (for High Court judges) can informally inquire into allegations against a judge and, in serious cases, request the judge to resign or, short of that, withdraw judicial work from the judge in question pending resolution — a lower-threshold, non-constitutional accountability mechanism operating alongside (not instead of) the formal Article 124/218 removal process.
Judicial Ethics — The Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997)
A set of ethical principles adopted by the Supreme Court's Full Court in 1997 — addressing matters like judges' conduct in public life, avoiding conflicts of interest, and maintaining the judiciary's independence and public confidence — a non-binding, aspirational code rather than a legally enforceable statute, but frequently invoked as the reference standard in judicial ethics discussions.
Judicial Accountability Bill (Various Iterations, Not Yet Enacted)
Multiple attempts (e.g., the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, first introduced in 2010) have sought to create a more formal, statutory mechanism for judicial complaints/accountability short of full removal — including proposals for mandatory judicial asset declarations and a National Judicial Oversight Committee — but no such comprehensive statute has been enacted as of this writing, leaving the informal in-house procedure as the primary practical accountability mechanism operating below the high threshold of full constitutional removal.
Common Traps
- No judge has ever actually been removed via the Article 124(4)/218 process — a frequently tested "has this ever happened" fact, similar in spirit to the Financial Emergency (never invoked) and joint sitting (only 3 times) facts elsewhere in this book.
- The "in-house procedure" is NOT a statutory mechanism — it is an informal, judiciary-evolved practice, existing alongside (not as a substitute for) the formal constitutional removal process.
- A comprehensive Judicial Accountability Bill has NOT been enacted — despite multiple legislative attempts since 2010, this remains an area without a dedicated statutory framework, unlike, e.g., the Lokpal framework for other public functionaries.
- The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, governs the investigative committee process, not the final removal vote itself — the final vote remains a purely constitutional (Article 124(4)) special-majority parliamentary process.
Solved Example (UPSC Prelims-Format MCQ)
Q1. Consider the following statements about judicial removal in India:
- No Supreme Court or High Court judge has ever been actually removed via the constitutional removal process.
- The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, governs the investigative committee process before a removal motion can be voted upon.
- The "in-house procedure" is a statutory mechanism established by the Judges (Inquiry) Act.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3
Answer: (a) — Statement 3 is incorrect; the in-house procedure is an informal, non-statutory judicial practice, not part of the 1968 Act.
Practice Set (Exam-Format MCQs)
Q1. A judge removal motion in the Lok Sabha requires signatures of at least how many members to be admitted? (a) 50 (b) 100 (c) 150 (d) 200 Answer: (b)
Q2. The Judges (Inquiry) Act's investigative committee comprises: (a) Only Supreme Court judges (b) A Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist (c) Only Members of Parliament (d) The CJI alone Answer: (b)
Q3. The "Restatement of Values of Judicial Life" (1997) is: (a) A binding statute (b) A non-binding, aspirational ethical code adopted by the Supreme Court's Full Court (c) A constitutional amendment (d) Part of the Judges (Inquiry) Act Answer: (b)
Q4. Has a comprehensive Judicial Accountability Bill (proposing a National Judicial Oversight Committee, etc.) been enacted in India? (a) Yes, in 2010 (b) Yes, in 2015 (c) No, it remains unenacted despite multiple attempts (d) Yes, as part of the NJAC Answer: (c)
Chapter 66 Quick Revision Sheet
- Formal removal: Article 124(4)/218 + Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (investigative committee: SC judge + HC CJ + jurist) → parliamentary special-majority vote. No judge has ever actually been removed.
- In-house procedure: Informal, non-statutory, CJI/Chief Justice-led inquiry mechanism, existing alongside formal removal.
- 1997 Restatement of Values: Non-binding ethical code.
- Judicial Accountability Bill: Multiple attempts since 2010, still not enacted.